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Abstract
“Irony, Finitude and The Good Life,” examines the notion that Socrates, as he is
portrayed in the Platonic dialogues, ought to be viewed and interpreted as a teacher. If
this assertion is correct, then it is both appropriate and useful to look to the dialogues for
instruction on how to live a philosophical life. This thesis will argue that to look at
Socrates as a teacher, a figure who imparts knowledge to those around him on how to live
a philosophical life, misses the very conception of the good life that Plato sought to
personify when he created the character of Socrates. The proceeding discussion draws
upon the work of Alexander Nehamas and Drew Hyland, offering an alternate
interpretation of the Symposium. This interpretation argues that viewing Socrates as a
teacher falsely idealizes the philosophical life, in turn neglecting Plato’s greater legacy
for his character—a legacy in which true virtue lies in exposing the creative possibility
inherent in living a philosophical life and prompting one’s own expression of a life
inspired by the legacy of Socrates.
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Introduction
Is this the life we want for ourselves? Is that the way we want, or need, to see and
hear?....Socrates is weird. He is, in fact, ‘not similar to any human being’. We feel, as
we look at him both awestruck and queasy, timidly homesick for ourselves. 1
Plato managed to create, in a single character, a complex and remarkably timeless
philosophical figure. One by-product of this legacy has been the tendency to view the
character of Socrates as a teacher whom readers can study in order to learn how to live a
good life. The inclination to read the Platonic corpus and the literary character of
Socrates in such a light is quite understandable: Socrates is not just a character to whom
we ascribe a body of philosophical positions; he is a vivid illustration of how philosophy
can become integrated into the expression of one’s personal identity. When we wonder
what it actually means to say that philosophers are “lovers of wisdom,” we need only
examine the character of Socrates to begin to understand what this love looks like and
what the cost of this claim might be. As a result, individuals seeking to live a life
centered on philosophy study the Platonic corpus in their quest to construct such a life for
themselves. But before looking to Socrates as an example, we must first question the
underlying assumptions driving us to look toward him in the first place—first, that his is
indeed the type of life worth living and second, that his is a life that is possible to
emulate. Once we have examined Socrates from a different vantage point, one that
questions his choice of this life above all others, we can honestly answer the question: “Is
this the life we want for ourselves?” If the answer to this question is indeed “yes,” then a
further exploration remains into whether emulating such a life is even possible.
Plato's personification of a philosophical lifestyle in the character of Socrates is
1
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an impressive philosophical achievement for its inexhaustible relevance to such a wide
variety of philosophical topics. It is precisely because of this breadth of relevance to so
many areas that we are able to see that such a lifestyle is not always elegant nor without
fault. The truth is, to borrow Martha Nussbaum’s sentiment, Socrates is weird. On a
superficial level, he is odd because he asks questions in response to questions asked of
him. He does not care in the least about his physical appearance in a society that was
very much preoccupied with beauty, yet he is the object of desire for many. He becomes
so enraptured in his thoughts that he stops in the middle of a journey to further
contemplate a promising idea with no concern whatsoever for his destination or his
traveling companions.2 He drinks but never becomes drunk. The modern reader’s
perception of Socrates as strange is not the result of an anachronistic misunderstanding.
It is clear that his peers thought Socrates was quite odd as well. Nowhere is his oddness
better illustrated than in his interpersonal interactions throughout the dialogues. In neither
the arguments nor the questions that Socrates poses does the key to his strangely playful
and elusive behavior emerge, requiring the reader to adopt a multi-layered interpretive
approach if she is to begin to understand him.
This thesis offers an alternate conception of Socrates based on an examination of
instances in the Symposium where he provokes both our wonder at his wisdom and our
discomfort at his otherness. This discussion centers on the view that Socrates was
primarily concerned with reconceptualizing commonly held views of daily experience,
views that most people, in his day as well as in our own, take for granted. A close
examination of the Symposium reveals that the commonly held conception of Socrates in
the Platonic dialogues as a teacher, in the traditional sense of the term, begins to fall
2
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apart. To view Socrates as a teacher is to miss the very conception of the good life that
this character exemplifies: a life that is self-directed. His is a life that is not only lived
but created with a deep concern for pursuing enduring answers to problems of great
philosophical importance.
A recurring theme, especially prominent in the Symposium, along with several
other dialogues, is the limitation that our erotic nature imposes upon us. Socrates makes
one substantive knowledge claim in the dialogues: to be an expert in ta erotika—the
erotic life. Traditionally, free-born, upper-class men of Athens adhered to a rigid social
structure stipulating the appropriate relationship between a young boy and an older male
who was both the boy’s pursuer and teacher.3 The relationship was sexual in nature, yet it
was expected to unfold under the strict social rules whereby the older of the two, the
erastes, would pursue and teach the boy, the eromenos, and instruct him in matters of
politics, warfare and other areas pertinent to becoming an adult male in Greek society.4
Physical or sexual interactions, providing both parties were genuinely interested in
creating a noble partnership, was to make up only a small portion of the relationship.
Socrates demonstrates an alternate conception of erotics in this dialogue, one
which differs greatly from the conception that informed the traditional erastes/eromenos
relationship. Socrates did not embrace the dominant erotic paradigm in Plato’s Athens.
Socrates rejects the typical erastes/eromenos paradigm for the same reasons he overtly
rejects the title of “teacher.” In the Apology, Socrates clearly rejects the title saying,
I have never come to an agreement with anyone
to act unjustly, neither with anyone else nor with
any one of those who they slanderously say are
3
4
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my pupils. I have never been anyone’s teacher.5
In Socrates’ view, the teacher, the erastes, become responsible not only for
imparting knowledge to the student, the eromenos, but also for forming his character. To
teach a young man about math and science, but fail to see that he grows into a man with
true character, is to fail as a teacher. His refusal of this role entails the belief that, while it
is possible to teach a student theoretical knowledge, it is impossible to teach him or her
how to apply this knowledge to their erotic or practical experience in a manner that will
necessarily inform the creation of an ethical and decent character. The application of
theoretical knowledge to the banalities of everyday, corporeal life is where one’s
character is built. Socrates’ reluctance to be considered a teacher reflects the belief that a
person’s character is built by him alone, even if others are there to help with the
acquisition of knowledge along the way.6 This is most clearly seen in Socrates’ rejection
of a hierarchical teaching paradigm for the dialectical, conversational approach for which
his philosophy became famous. Socrates engages his interlocutors in conversations about
topics that they believe they fully grasp. Only when thee conversations prompt his
interlocutors to reexamine concepts they had taken for granted do they realize that they
have mistaken familiarity for understanding.
By not embracing the most intuitive label that could be placed upon him—teacher
—Socrates makes others suspicious of him. In creating a life intent on breaking down
commonly held conceptions and social norms, Socrates fell outside the conventional
confines of the good life in ancient Greek society. One constant feature of the dialogues is
that Socrates is exclusively shown engaging with others; his brand of philosophy is
5
6
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unarguably social in nature. Above all, he is concerned with the give and take, the back
and forth between himself and his companions. When his dialectical approach is
understood as distinct from the teacher/student paradigm, a different interpretation of
Socrates’ method and his actions emerges.
This project will focus on a single dialogue from which to examine the question
of whether it is accurate to consider Socrates both a teacher and an individual who lived a
good life. However, what makes a life “good” is not easily defined apart from a specific
context, and given the plethora of scenes and situations in which Socrates is portrayed as
a part of, one must examine the whole of Plato’s work to answer the question in any
definitive way. What is easier to grasp is the picture of Socrates that emerges when
looking at the conversations in which he engages in the Symposium. This dialogue is
particularly useful for collecting images of Socrates that help us to gain important insight
into his character for several reasons. First, within this dialogue Socrates claims to be an
expert in the erotic arts and demonstrates this knowledge in a speech recounting what he
learned from a Mantinean priestess, Diotima. Second, this dialogue informs our inquiry
into whether Socrates is a teacher. His final speech of the dialogue contains a detailed
discussion of the form of Beauty. The portion of the dialogue dedicated to an explanation
of this form is not so much a lesson Socrates teaches to his companions as it is an
instance of his offering his insight on what he believes the final goal of eros to be. Lastly,
this dialogue provides a number of dynamic interactions between Socrates and the men
gathered in the dialogue which are illuminated once it becomes clear how his view of
eros influences his interactions with them.
To narrow and guide the discussion, the work of Alexander Nehamas and Drew

6

Hyland will be applied to various interpretive aspects of the dialogue. Both philosophers
share a broad view of the Platonic dialogue, one in which creativity is fundamental to
Plato’s project. In part, each shares the insight that gaining the richest and most accurate
understanding of the dialogues requires one to read them while keeping in mind that, as
Alexander Nehamas notes,
Philosophy in our time may have become a largely
abstract discipline, whose task is to solve or dissolve
an equally abstract set of philosophical problems.
But we must recognize that it was not always so,
and it was especially not so for Plato.7
Drew Hyland makes the similar point:
The truth is that philosophy has become a theoretical
discipline over time and as a result of many complex
historical developments.8
Nehamas’s and Hyland’s work reveals an interest in the convergence of problems
typically thought of as abstractly philosophical and the concerns of our everyday life.
While this convergence does make Socrates a more dynamic character, it also creates a
significant obstacle to understanding the role Plato intended his character to serve for his
reader.
This challenge is reflected in one of the most perplexing facts about Socrates’
behavior throughout the dialogues: he often behaves as a teacher and is perceived by
many around him as a teacher, yet he himself never embraces the title. The discrepancy
between how Socrates is perceived and the claims he makes lies at the heart of the
confusion of trying to understand why Socrates is an example—if not the best example—
of a good human life.
7
8
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This discrepancy is related to the paradox in “the problem of irony” that many
Platonic scholars, including Nehamas and Hyland, have addressed. The interpretive
problem asks whether Socrates’ refusal to be labeled a teacher should be taken at face
value or whether it should be considered an important instance of Socratic irony. One
proposed solution has been to postulate that while Socrates says he is not a teacher, he
really means the opposite. The typical explanation for this is that Socrates uses irony
pedagogically as a way of encouraging others to think on their own. This view of
Socratic irony in the dialogues is explained in detail in Chapter One. In addition, the first
chapter discusses how Platonic irony, as Nehamas understands it, relates to the general
philosophical project Plato had in mind while writing the dialogues. Nehamas’ insight
into irony demonstrates its use as a tool in the creation of a dynamic and creative life.
This section concludes by outlining a new conception of a Platonic “good life,” one that
is concerned with the creation of a unique self and not the adherence to a particular
ethical framework. Chapter Two focuses on Drew Hyland’s work, Finitude and
Transcendence in the Platonic Dialogues, and examines the limitations and possibilities
that emerge from the interaction between intellectual and interpersonal relationships.
The ways in which the Symposium concretely demonstrate Socrates’ willingness
to confront and accept his finitude is explored at length in Chapter Three. This chapter
looks closely at Diotima's speech on Eros and its culmination in an explanation of the
ladder of love and the revelation of the form of Beauty. This final chapter closes with an
examination of the interaction between Socrates and Alcibiades at the end of the dialogue
in light of the dialectical approach to finitude discussed in Chapter Two and Nehamas’
claim that it is a mistaken to consider Socrates a teacher.

8

Understanding whether Socrates lived a good life lies partially in examining how
he navigates his own life, and this understanding must be had before deciding if he is an
example to be emulated. What does the picture of Socrates that emerges from this
dialogue offer by way of a model that helps to bridge the gap between our theoretical
commitments and the experiences of daily life? The primary objective of the proceeding
discussion is to demonstrate how one Platonic dialogue, the Symposium, can be read as an
example of a successful merging of the theoretical, abstract work of philosophy and the
practical realities of living a human life. This thesis argues that viewing Socrates as a
teacher falsely idealizes the philosophical life. This wrong-headed assessment neglects
Plato’s greater legacy for his character—a legacy whose true virtue lies in exposing the
creative possibility inherent in living a philosophical life and prompting the expression of
a life inspired by the legacy of Socrates.

9

Chapter 1
Teaching Irony
A philosopher who is a certain kind of person is also, of course, a person who has views
on philosophical issues.... But what matters is not just the answers such a person gives.
What matters is that a personality emerges who has asked certain kinds of questions and
given certain kinds of answers to them, and who, most importantly, has constructed a life
around such questions and answers.9
One of the greatest obstacles confronting an interpreter of the Platonic dialogues
is the problem of irony. Irony in the dialogues is enigmatic, leading an interpreter to
question, at a minimum, the sincerity of Socrates’ interactions with his interlocutors. On
a deeper level, irony calls into question the widely held view of Socrates as an honest,
sincere and paramount example of a life lived in the pursuit of knowledge. As Platonic
scholarship has developed, the significance of irony in the dialogues has yielded varying
accounts of the two types of irony found in the dialogues: Socratic and Platonic. Irony, in
either form, can give the reader a deeper sense of the personality and character of
Socrates while also highlighting the discrepancies between what Socrates says and how
he often acts. Reconciling these discrepancies, or at the very least being able to account
for their presence, is crucial in deciphering what kind of picture of Socrates one can
reasonably form based on the Platonic dialogues.
Socratic irony, as it is commonly understood,10 is exemplified when the character
of Socrates seems to be saying one thing to his interlocutors but meaning the opposite.
9

Nehamas, as quoted in Carrier, 41
This type of irony was made popular by Gregory Vlastos’ work. Vlastos’ book,
Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher, grew out of a number of articles gaining him
the reputation as a leading expert in Greek thought. Nehamas was a student of Vlastos
and a great deal of his work on irony is a response to his mentor.
10
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Socratic irony, in this simple form, is often easy to detect and decipher. Typically, one
has only to assume that Socrates means the opposite of what he says to glean the actual
meaning behind this type of irony. A paradigmatic example of Socratic irony can be
found in the Symposium when Socrates praises Agathon’s speech in honor of eros and
comments, “I realized how ridiculous I’d been to agree to join with you in praising Love
and to say that I was a master of the art of love, when I knew nothing whatever of this
business, of how anything whatever ought to be praised.”11 Several lines later, Socrates
illustrates just the opposite when he launches into a speech in which he recounts all that
he has learned about Love from his teacher, Diotima. In addition to illustrating the ways
Agathon’s view is misguided, Socrates reveals the extent of his expertise in “the art of
love.”
In cases of Socratic irony, irony is attributed to the character of Socrates (as
opposed to the writer, Plato) and is not often detected by those to whom Socrates directs
his irony. Socratic irony often seems like a private joke between Socrates and the reader.
As the reader watches Socrates question his conversation partners, she is able to see
where his interlocutors’ answers are unsatisfactory or ridiculous. This simple form of
irony provides the reader with a sense that she understands Socrates, thus giving the
reader the impression that she is clever in a way that Socrates’ conversational partners are
not. This understanding between the reader and Socrates is created by Plato’s setting up
the expectation in advance that Socrates is always going to be the wisest character present
in the dialogue. The reader is made to feel that she understands Socrates’ wisdom simply
because (perhaps unlike his interlocutors) she already knows that Socrates is wise before
he says anything at all. The presumption that Socrates is wiser than his interlocutor is
11
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encouraged by the fact that we rarely see Socrates out-and-about looking for someone to
enlighten him.12 Socrates often claims to be seeking enlightenment from his interlocutor.
Yet, such claims are quickly interpreted as ironic when the dialogue comes to an end and
the clear inadequacies of his interlocutor’s understanding of the topic is revealed.
Additionally, Socrates is typically the one leading the conversation through the questions
he asks, steering his interlocutors on to his desired path. As a result, our interpretation of
Socrates will more than likely be in favor of finding wisdom in his words—even if we do
not fully understand them ourselves.
Platonic irony is a more complicated and layered term that attributes irony to the
writer of the work, not to the personality of the character. In the same manner that
Socratic irony highlights the ignorance of the other characters in the dialogue, Platonic
irony is aimed at exposing the ignorance of the reader. Platonic irony is revealed, in part,
by the dialogue format. Because the dialogue provides the reader with clues about the
characters’ personalities and environment, it is somewhat easier for Plato’s audience to
understand why the characters and the subjects discussed are paired.13
Alexander Nehamas has contributed significantly to the topic of Platonic irony,
and his work cites this particular form of irony as vital to understanding Plato’s, rather
than Socrates’, overarching philosophical project. According to Nehamas, each type of
irony is crucial to the existence of the other and their conjunction is important to the
delivery of the overarching philosophical message within any given dialogue. While
12

Nehamas, Art of Living, 36
This important point will be examined in greater depth in the next chapter. For now, it
is useful to note that both Nehamas and Hyland believe the issue of narrative context is
more than a mere frame to display the more important theoretical content in the
dialogues. It is probably going too far to say that the dialogue format is as significant as
the philosophical content, but it is certainly seen by both philosophers as an influence that
shapes the content of the dialogues.
13
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Nehamas views each as a separate entity, each is so connected to the other and to the
outcome of Plato’s overall philosophical project that it often becomes difficult to
delineate where one begins and the other ends. Before discussing how Socratic and
Platonic irony are connected, each type of irony will be examined on its own to explore
what Nehamas understands the function of each to be.
Nehamas claims that it is too easy for a reader to be mistaken about the meaning
of Socratic irony. The seeming transparency of Socratic irony placates the reader into
believing she has grasped the point of the dialogue and does not prompt her to dig deeper
to discover Platonic irony. Platonic irony, he believes, is easier for a reader to miss
because it affects her ability to intuit accurately the deeper message that Plato is trying to
offer. Platonic irony, in conjunction with Socratic irony, unlocks the overriding structure
within the dialogue to deliver Plato’s greater philosophic message.
Like his approach to Socratic irony, Nehamas partially rejects the common
understanding of Platonic irony made popular by Leo Strauss and his followers. Strauss’
position, as it is generally understood, is as follows:
The main idea is that Plato holds a number of explicit
philosophical views that, for a number of reasons,
he does not want to make public. Accordingly,
he uses the structure and characterization of his works
to undermine their obvious meaning and to
suggest his real intentions to those who can follow the
secret thread of his thought.14
What Nehamas rejects with respect to Strauss’s position is the interpretive style that
typically accompanies this conception of Platonic irony that, he suggests, “supposes the
absolute distinction between the literary and the philosophical and rigidly subordinates

14
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the former to the latter.”15 Instead, Nehamas believes that the more interesting aspect of
Platonic irony lies in the assertion that Plato embedded his philosophical message within
the literary form of the text. However, this position is often expressed alongside the view
that Plato subordinates literature to philosophy and “transforms it into a supplementary
carrier of a detachable philosophical message.”16 For Nehamas though, viewing the
characters of the Platonic dialogue as “detachable (from the) philosophical message”
oversimplifies Plato’s project. To separate the philosophical lessons from the characters
who struggle with them is to fail to recognize the seriousness with which Plato takes the
connection between an individual’s knowledge and her character. Our philosophical
convictions, our ignorance and even our indifference inform and reflect our character.
Socratic irony delivers the message in the conversations between Socrates and his
interlocutors while Platonic irony ensures that the personal and more profound lesson is
conveyed to the reader. If a reader is satisfied with the idea that Socrates’ interlocutor is
foolishly mistaken, a crucial message and experience is missed. What this reader fails to
understand, according to Nehamas, is that while she is passing judgment upon Socrates’
interlocutor, Plato is using her to make an example of an even deeper type of ignorance.
Because the Platonic dialogues are concerned with philosophical topics, each dialogue
bears importance not just for the persons with whom Socrates is engaged, but also to each
and every one of us. When we come away from a dialogue with only the understanding
of the errors of Euthyphro or Alcibiades, we fail to look more deeply at where we are
mistaken with respect to the very same issue. Just because I can see, thanks to Socrates’
questioning, that Agathon’s speech in praise of Eros is lacking this insight, does not mean
15
16
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I have any better of an understanding of why or how the activity of praising Eros is either
useful or mistaken in the first place.17 The idea is that if the reader is able to see the
places where the interlocutors fail to get the deeper philosophical message, this ought to
prompt her to take a step back and question the breadth and depth of her own
understanding on the same matter. Upon reflection, she might find that she is no better
off. And so for Nehamas, the central purpose of Platonic irony is to prompt reflection on
the part of the reader, not to demonstrate the failures of the characters that Plato created
with these shortcomings. Given the nature of these dialogues, we are obligated—if we
are to be considered honest interpreters—not to leave the dialogues behind when we
close our book. We are all too eager to agree with Socrates, “yet we refuse the kind of life
our agreement with Socrates demands.”18 The typical reader of a dialogue expects that by
the end of a dialogue she will have learned something definitive from Socrates’
conversations with his interlocutors. But ironically, the reader is often left just as puzzled
as the characters she encounter in the dialogue.
At this point, returning to Socratic irony is crucial to get a full sense of the overall
interpretive problem of irony as Nehamas understands it. This will also more clearly
situate the importance of irony in Nehamas’ broader thesis in the Art of Living. While
Nehamas does not reject the notion that Socratic irony exists and plays a crucial role in
the dialogue, he disagrees with the more basic conception of Socratic irony given
earlier.19 He argues that this definition is too simplistic to capture what Plato is up to in
17

This is because, as we learn from Socrates, one is mistaken to praise eros and attribute
to the god qualities such as beauty, when eros has a desire for beauty and would not
desire that which he already has.
18
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This more basic conception states that the true meaning of Socrates’ words can be
found in assuming the opposite of what he says.
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the dialogues. Additionally, this definition calls into question the sincerity of Socrates
and his message. It is quite plausible to argue that Socrates often went around trying to
trick his less intelligent interlocutors. That Socratic irony can be read as the philosopher
being unkind to his conversation partners is central to a significant question surrounding
the use of irony in the dialogues. Socrates has been seen as an example of an ideal
philosopher and a teacher. As such, it is difficult to reconcile even the possibility of
deceit in his words. Nehamas believes that a more accurate characterization of Socratic
irony focuses on concealment rather than deceit. Viewing Socratic irony as concealment,
instead of deceit, makes this type of irony a tool of indeterminacy and shrouds Socrates in
mystery. Nehamas explains this indeterminacy as follows:
Intermediate between lying and truthfulness, it
[Socratic irony] shares features with both: like
truthfulness, concealment does not distort the
truth; like lying, it does not reveal it. Once we
have rejected the view that irony consists simply
in saying the contrary of what you mean,
concealment cannot, even when irony is detected,
lead us to the ironist’s real meaning.20
Nehamas believes that it is more helpful to look at what the presence of irony reveals
about the overall accessibility of the character of Socrates than focusing on what each
instance of Socratic irony means. For Nehamas, Socratic irony suggests depth within the
character of Socrates but ultimately does not guarantee its existence.21 His use of “depth”
in this context refers to the underlying meaning or wisdom irony conceals. He argues
that the reader may be able to recognize Socratic irony but is ultimately unable to
determine the exact meaning of ironic statements. Even further, he argues that one
cannot assume safely that the presence of irony suggests any wisdom or knowledge at all
20
21

Nehamas, Art of Living, 62
Ibid., 67

16

on the part of this enigmatic philosopher.
Nehamas likens ironic concealment to a mask worn by Socrates. The Socrates of
the early dialogues, he claims, reveals no depth and is fully hidden by this mask.22 There
is little revelation of the theoretical underpinnings, or depth, to either Socrates’ behavior
or his wisdom. The early dialogues contain scarce evidence indicating that his words and
behavior are the expression of a larger set of theoretical convictions. Socrates is
presented to the reader as an individual with a unified, coherent and consistent set of
philosophical positions with little indication as to how he came to be this way. In later
dialogues, Nehamas argues that the mask of irony Socrates wears begins to be partially
peeled away and Plato reveals the philosophical underpinnings of his character’s speech
and behavior. Slowly pieces of information about Socrates are revealed in the middle and
later dialogues and helps to focus the picture of how Socrates came to exemplify what
many see as the ideal philosophical life.
Socratic irony and Platonic irony, come together in Nehamas’ work to create the
foundation for what he believes is an alternate way of practicing philosophy.23 This
alternate style began with the Socrates of Plato’s dialogues and evolved into what became
an underground philosophical culture continued by Montaigne, Nietzsche and Foucault.
Nehamas refers to this alternate practice of philosophy as the “art of living.” The art of
living is primarily concerned with the creation of the self. Philosophers of the art of
living “adopt the position that a self is not a given but a constructed unity.”24 The
22

Ibid., 67-68
By alternate way of practicing philosophy Nehamas means alternative to how
philosophy is taught in schools and universities today. Specifically he is referring to the
emphasis on theoretical philosophy over practical (or lived) philosophy which he focuses
on in the Art of Living. See the introduction to the Art of Living for a more lengthy
discussion (1-15).
24
Ibid., 4
23
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“materials” used to create this unity are composed of an individual’s philosophical
position.25 The unified and coherent articulation of philosophical positions constitutes
both the work and the life of philosophers in this tradition.
Most crucial to this method of philosophical practice is that the creation of a self
always culminates in an authentically one-of-a-kind individual. Because philosophers of
“the art of living” draw on a mixture of life experiences and theoretical influences to
construct the self, it is virtually impossible to imitate the process by which one comes to
be a philosopher in this tradition. The inability to duplicate the process by which one
becomes what one is is a crucial part of the art of living for Nehamas. Plato uses irony as
a tool to conceal the process by which Socrates came to be the man and the philosopher
he was. Nehamas acknowledges the possibility that Plato himself may not have had a
solid conception of how the historical Socrates came to be the way he was, and this may
have been a motive for creating the character of Socrates as the mouthpiece of his own
philosophical work. Thus, irony is a means of reflecting Plato’s puzzlement. Yet there
was something surrounding Socrates, both the historical and the fictional individual,
which prompts others to wonder how he came to be the way he was. Irony creates the
space in the dialogues for one to wonder how Socrates came to be “both the most
coherent and the least explicable model of philosophical life we possess.”26

25
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Chapter 2
The Possibility of Finite Transcendence
Human happiness is an objective goal. It can be approached using one's appreciation of
what the world is like and how one can work within the constraints that nature places
upon us . . . in order to change it.27
The art of living requires focus, determination and a vivid understanding of the
beliefs, principles and ideas that will guide the final product: the self. A life, unlike a
sculpture that begins with a formless block of clay, comes with form (context) and
content with which the creator must reckon, struggle and if she is to eventually succeed,
transform. Yet we are bound to realize eventually that to practice the art of living one has
to integrate the inevitable limitations that all human circumstances entail. This venture
does not require creativity alone; it also demands coherence of vision.
Drew Hyland is interested in the creative aspect of the pursuit of a philosophical
life as well as with demonstrating to a contemporary audience what the Platonic
dialogues have to offer. Specifically, he is concerned with how our immediate spatial
location and our situation in life play a role in our understanding of the dialogues.28
Hyland’s work outlines how place informs the content of any philosophical discussion.
He maintains that the specific situations in which we see Socrates and his interlocutors
reveal a more general theoretical framework guiding Socrates’ project in the dialogues.
Hyland argues that the dialogues show that,
A given philosophic position must always be understood
as arising out of a given set of conditions: these sorts of
people, with these abilities and limitations, in these
sorts of situations, facing these problems, at these times
in their lives, holding this or that conviction.29
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Hyland presents two themes that he argues are always present in the Platonic
dialogues. The first theme is drawn from the observation that the situations in which we
see Socrates and his conversation-partners always present some type of limiting
condition. Limiting conditions can be represented in a wide variety of ways, ranging
from the intellectual and conversational abilities of the characters, to their role in society,
to the confines of a specific spatio-temporal location in which they find themselves (e.g. a
prison or party). These limiting conditions always serve the greater purpose of providing
the individual with the opportunity to confront his finitude: the restrictions determined by
the human condition.
The second theme, which always appears alongside limitation according to
Hyland, is possibility. Being able to recognize possibility in the presence of limitation
depends upon an individual’s attitude towards its presence. Hyland refers to this
possibility as transcendence and claims that it serves two main objectives. Someone
whose actions demonstrate transcendence is able to recognize the frailty of our human
situation and, in turn, strives to make something positive and constructive in spite of the
presence of limitations. The recognition of possibility allows us to look at the truth of our
existence-–our finitude—without leaving us completely overwhelmed. By providing a
mechanism by which we can face our limitations without despair, human beings are able
to transforming these limited circumstances. Transcendence requires adopting a way of
viewing the world that guides us toward a more temperate alternative when confronting
our existential constraints. In order to view the world from the perspective of
transcendence, an individual must first recognize that there is something that they lack
but also desire. The perceived lack could be any number of things: material objects, good
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health, or even wisdom. When human desire, or eros, propels the individual toward the
thing she lacks, the individual becomes mindful that there are constraints, either internal
or external, that will interfere with fulfilling her desire. In Hyland’s terms, “all human
aspiration is a movement to negate experienced incompleteness. But this negation is not
merely negative. It is at once an effort to transcend that incompleteness.”30
According to Hyland, the alternatives to transcendence manifest themselves in
several general ways that individuals typically react when confronted with the inherently
limiting nature of our human situation. Some may become aggressive towards life.31
Others become submissive in the face of the realization of human frailty.32 Individuals
who adopt a more passive approach do not question external restraints when confronted
with them. Instead, they become resigned to these restrictions and eventually become
dominated by limitation. The final way of addressing finitude is what Hyland refers to as
the dialectic position. The dialectic position is the stance Hyland argues Socrates adopts
throughout the Platonic dialogues. Adopting the dialectic position means acknowledging
and seeking to understand finitude for what it is and responding to limitation by
transforming these constraints into possibility.33 Hyland notes that this last strategy is
most difficult because the domination and submission responses are tempting and far
easier options. Neither of these responses requires the same creativity involved in
reframing one’s reaction so as to engender possibility. The dialectic position requires us
to accept that finitude exists as a real obstacle and that we have the creative ability to find
30
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possibilities within this obstacles. For Hyland the dialectic position is not simply the
position of Socrates; it is the purpose of philosophy.
The creative activity of finding not a solution to but an opportunity in finitude is
grounded for Hyland in Socratic irony.34 He believes that irony plays an important role in
Plato’s philosophy, particularly in illustrating Socrates’ recognition and transformation of
limitations. According to Hyland, Socratic irony serves several functions in the
dialogues, not the least of which is to further the philosophical positions that Socrates
defends. Hyland believes that Plato uses irony as a way of incorporating in the dialogues
“the decisive presence of negativity in human life and as a philosophical issue.”35 While
irony is not identical with negativity from his vantage point, he maintains that Plato uses
irony to demonstrate the negativity often present in finitude.36
The nature of philosophy and the general project of philosophers is to gain
knowledge of the whole of every aspect of our existence.37 Despite our most noble
attempts at achieving this knowledge, we are doomed to fail because of the magnitude of
the project and the inadequacy of the resources at our disposal. Hyland claims that, had
Plato believed knowledge of the whole was possible, he would have written a single
comprehensive “speech” of philosophy.38 It is because of Socrates’ acknowledgement of
our finitude that he claims that he is not wise even though everyone around him believes
him to be. Socrates’ claim that he is not wise reflects his “recognition that he is not wise
34
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in the divine sense of comprehensive knowledge.”39 This denial of wisdom, in the
qualified sense of not possessing “divine, comprehensive knowledge”, demonstrates
Socrates’ understanding of the limitations corporeal existence imposes on him.40 Yet his
continued dedication to philosophy in the face of this acknowledgement is the mark of
finite transcendence.
Hyland’s interpretation of irony as a form of finite transcendence in the Platonic
dialogues is well exhibited in the Symposium by the nature of eros. Eros is described in
every speech given in this dialogue as having characteristics of both finitude and
transcendence. This is because eros is inseparable from what it means to be human: “the
central ontological source of negativity or finitude for Plato, and so of Platonic irony, is
human nature itself: our nature as erotic.”41 In her description of eros, Diotima uses
language that reflects both the negativity often present in the limiting conditions of
finitude and the incisive way in which negativity can be transformed into possibility, or
transcendence within finitude.42
Like eros, finitude and transcendence are both only fully realized when an
individual engages with others. The dialectic position cannot be taught, in the same way a
deep and practical understanding of eros cannot be taught. This position allows two
individuals to engage one another as equals, to see where the limitations of those specific
circumstances arise and to understand how the limitations can be overcome. A teacher,
by our common conception, does not engage a student as an equal and this lack of mutual
reciprocity between the two is what stands in the way of eros being a teachable concept.
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Socrates’ actions, throughout the dialogues, can be minimally classified as being
concerned with one fundamental task: engagement with others.
Hyland's ideas concerning finitude and transcendence illuminate the character of
Alcibiades. His keen awareness of others’ strengths and weaknesses is what makes
Socrates such a good example of someone who adopts the dialectical position. He is able
to see possibility in a situation or an individual even when it falls short of what he may
want it to be.43 At the end of the Symposium, Alcibiades recounts the ways in which he
tried to seduce Socrates in to being his lover. This scene shows Alcibiades as a perfect
example of someone who first handles confrontation with finitude and later, with
aggression when that does not get him what he wants, with passivity. Alcibiades is not
able to seduce Socrates by inviting him to the gymnasium and twice to dinner. Each time
he plays the pursuer, even while Greek society had clear roles for the relationship: the
older man was to pursue the younger. Alcibiades, the younger of the two, was to learn
from Socrates and in this role was expected to be passive, allowing Socrates to pursue
him. When Socrates does not respond to Alcibiades’ physical beauty or advances, he
reacts by taking control and trying to pressure Socrates to elevate their relationship to
another level, one that incorporated a sexual dimension. The more general limiting
conditions that confront Alcibiades in his pursuit of Socrates are the rule-and-role-bound
mores of Greek society that governed the relationships between men and boys. To this
limitation Alcibiades responds with aggression, violating conventions and trying to be
alone with Socrates as much as possible. But when it is time to confess his love and
devotion to Socrates, he becomes docile. He tells Socrates, “It would be really stupid of
43
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me to not give you anything you want: you can have me, my belongings, anything my
friends might have.”44 When Socrates turns down Alcibiades’ offer to exchange his body
for Socrates’ wisdom, the young man is struck by the realization that his good looks,
what he has, will not get him everything he wants in life. Instead Socrates suggests that
they pursue a different type of relationship, one defined in more mutual terms, terms that
echo the dialectic position Hyland attributes to Socrates.45
Socrates’ behavior towards Alcibiades in this situation is the antithesis of the
common erastes/eromenos relationship. Had Socrates cared to pursue a relationship with
Alcibiades based on the teacher-student dynamic he would have found himself in an ideal
situation. In a proper relationship between an older man and a boy, the older man was to
act as the pursuer and teacher to the boy enlightening him in a wide variety of topics such
as politics, economics and warfare. Instead, Socrates reframes their relationship for
Alcibiades, creating a relationship that reached beyond the limitations of the traditional
relationship and uncovering a different, mutual course for their relationship to take. By
showing that his refusal of the young man’s advances did not mean the end of any sort of
relationship between the two, Socrates offered Alcibiades something more valuable than
the traditional relationship. Socrates shows Alcibiades that possibility can and often does
dwell in limitation. Teaching, however, was not the goal of Socrates’ interaction with
Alcibiades. Socrates was astute enough regarding Alcibiades’ emotional maturity to
recognize that a physical relationship was not appropriate, nor could Socrates be
responsible for making Alcibiades the kind of man he wants to be. While transforming
the relationship into one beneficial to both might have taught Alcibiades an important
44
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lesson, clearly Socrates was aware that Alcibiades might not be able to appreciate fully
their new way of relating. In this confrontation with Socrates, Alcibiades is given
renewed possibilities where he formerly viewed only limitations. Awareness of the
dialectical position can be prompted in a context of mutuality, but it can only be
actualized on one’s own.
Hyland argues that with practice the dialectic position leads to what he refers to as
“finite transcendence.” Finite transcendence is by no means an answer to the problem of
human limitations. A crucial part of becoming successful at engaging situations from the
dialectical position is finding a proper balance. An equilibrium must be struck between
accepting the limitations of a situation that cannot be overcome and recognizing a chance
for a limitation to be turned in to an opportunity. A crucial aspect of Hyland’s thesis is
that finding possibility in limitation does not always mean finding the solution originally
sought. For this reason, finite transcendence is a particularly useful concept in the
context of our erotic lives.
Finite transcendence shares similar characteristics with Eros (the divinity) that
Diotima describes in the Symposium as being neither fully human nor fully a god. Eros is
able to dwell within limitation because it is his nature to “always find a way.”46 Finite
transcendence is about finding and making “a way” when faced with limitations. Here
we return to Nehamas’ concept of the art of living as one such example of “finding a
way” in the context of a greater intellectual and stylistic project.
Hyland’s position on the presence of finite transcendence in the dialogues is
compatible with Nehamas’ concept of the art of living in part because both philosophers
46
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recognize the creativity with which Socrates engages others and the world around him.
Hyland’s emphasis on locatedness in the dialogues indicates why Socrates often
differentiates himself from those around him. He does not become frozen by limitations,
and he is never seen trying to manage limitations within circumstances by acting
aggressively or by behaving passively. Even when he dares to die, he does so in honor of
something greater, not simply because he had given up. By acknowledging the
possibility present within limitation, Socrates is able to find many different situations and
interactions valuable an ability that affords him more opportunities to make the outcome
of a set of circumstances his own. By making an outcome his own, Socrates is able to
accumulate a set of experiences that over time define, in a deliberate and reasoned way,
who he is.
Because of the emphasis Hyland places upon the specifics of the situation
Socrates and his interlocutors are in, the concepts of finitude and finite transcendence
complement the idea of the art of living. Others could never exactly duplicate Socrates’
actions or responses because all of the contributing factors would never again be brought
together in that particular configuration. What a reader of the Platonic dialogues gleans
from Socrates is a style that does not lend itself to duplications. We can be given the basic
tools to be able to recognize when further consideration of an idea or concept would be
valuable. Yet, Socrates is not seen in the dialogues telling anyone how to apply an idea or
a concept to another life. Socrates does not dictate to those around him how his
philosophy would best be applied to their lives because to truly apply philosophy to one’s
life requires that an individual to bring her own personal style to the process of
integration. And style is one thing Socrates cannot teach his interlocutors. Socrates
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simply gets his fellow interlocutors to reconsider things they so often take for granted by
engaging them in a novel way. A byproduct of studying his engagement with others
could result in learning something from Socrates. Indeed, this may happen routinely
when one spends time with the Platonic dialogues. However, attributing the title and
responsibilities of “teacher” to Socrates encourages the reader to forget the aspects of
mutuality that mark Plato’s philosophical project. Socrates may have pointed her in the
direction of any number of philosophical realizations, but the reader must take
responsibility for noticing where Socrates is pointing, figuring out what he meant, and
deciding whether to make it her own.
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Chapter 3
Erotic Games of Irony
You can’t imagine how little he cares whether a person is beautiful, or rich, or famous
in any other way that most people admire. He considers all these possessions beneath
contempt, and that’s exactly how he considers all of us as well. In public, I tell you, his
whole life is one big game—a game of irony.47
This chapter offers a detailed reading of the Symposium, drawing on the insights
by Alexander Nehamas and Drew Hyland discussed in the previous two chapters. This
analysis will emphasize two aspects of the text. First, it will examine how subtle details
in the dialogue reveal Socrates’ acknowledgement and acceptance of his finitude. The
second part of this reading will focus on the speech Socrates gives on eros and its his
explanation of the ladder of love. This reading pays particular attention to the
interactions between Socrates and Alcibiades and Socrates and Diotima at the conclusion
of the text and further substantiates the dialectical approach to finitude discussed in
Chapter Two, while also incorporating Nehamas’ insights about the limitations of
Socrates’ knowledge.
There are several details at the beginning of this dialogue which indicate to reader
that she will observe Socrates in an anomalous set of circumstances. This dialogue forces
the reader to integrate the philosophical nature of love put forth by Socrates with some
intimate details in order to make sense of this unusual character. One such detail is when
Aristodemus first meets Socrates on his way to Agathon’s house and takes note of his
unusual appearance. Aristodemus is struck by the fact that Socrates has “just bathed and
put on his fancy sandals”48and asks him where he is going. Socrates’ unusually
47
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meticulous appearance leads Aristodemus to wonder what occasion warrants such special
effort on the part of the typically disheveled philosopher. Socrates’ appearance may not
seem to have anything to do with his philosophy, but in a culture such as ancient Greece,
appearance mattered. And we know from Alcibiades’ description of Socrates’ attraction
to beautiful boys that it mattered, or seemed to matter, to him as well. Socrates answers
Aristodemus’ inquiry with the following: “I took great pains with my appearance; I am
going to the house of a good looking man; I had to look my best.”49 Socrates has taken
usual care to make himself “beautiful” to go to a party—the very same party where he
will try to persuade those present that seeing true Beauty alters how we perceive earthly
beauty. This detail is compelling because it supports a claim made earlier: Socrates often
seems strange because his words and actions do not make sense together. This claim
coupled with the knowledge that Socrates is rather lax about keeping up his physical
appearance fits nicely with the ascent to Beauty he explains later. But before reaching
that part of the dialogue, the answer to Aristodemus’ inquiry can cause confusions. This
discrepancy between his claim that carnal beauty is the lowest form of beauty and his
actions which indicate that he is very taken with the physical beauty of younger, desirable
men can only be overcome by looking at this discrepancy with the insight provided by
Hyland. Socrates appears to appreciate the physicality of those around him while also
recognizing that it is the furthest from the ideal form of Beauty. He is consciously and
comfortably able to occupy the middle ground between his temporal existence and his
striving for the intellectual ideal of the form. He can see the relationship between the
higher and lower manifestations of this form. While he is fully aware of the power of
beauty beyond the confines of earthly instances, Socrates can also acknowledge physical
49

Ibid., 174a

30

beauty without losing sight of true Beauty.
Another revealing detail is found in the interaction between the priestess Diotima
and the young Socrates. Even though he never embraces the title, those around him see
Socrates as a teacher. As such, he is perceived as wise and always in possession of the
answer to the philosophical questions he poses. The conversation between Socrates and
Diotima, whom he identifies as the one who “instructed me in the things of love,” reveals
Socrates in an uncharacteristic state: as a student who does not have the answers to his
teacher’s questions. Diotima’s tone toward the young Socrates is one of frustration when
he is unable answer her questions. Their exchange makes it clear that even Socrates
struggled to understand the true nature of eros just as we see Agathon and the others
struggle in their speeches in praise of the divinity. Comments like “at this point it’s clear
to even a child,”50 “do you think you will ever be skilled in the things of love if you don’t
understand this?”51 and “into these things of love, Socrates, perhaps even you may be
initiated”52 reveal the Priestess’ frustration with the places where his knowledge falls
short. The readers as well as those present in the Symposium are meant to take away a
clear message from this encounter: even Socrates had to labor to abandon his common
but unreasoned beliefs in order to acquire true mastery of the one thing he later claims to
know: eros.
Diotima’s speech lacks a crucial, perhaps more fundamental, requirement to gain
mastery of the erotic—personal experience. Witnessing this exchange between Socrates
and Diotima also makes clear that the conception of eros put forth by Socrates, in the
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words of Diotima, requires training and guidance to be “educated in the things of love.”53
Yet no amount of instruction can serve as a substitute for the experience necessary to
guide one toward the true purpose, the final goal of our erotic experience.
The fact that Diotima, a priestess, is the one who initiates Socrates into the only
thing he will profess any knowledge of, gestures towards an answer to the problem of
irony. Namely: what does Socrates mean when he says he is not a teacher? What kind of
knowledge does he have if not the type transmittable to others? After seeing how Diotima
initiated Socrates into this knowledge, it becomes clear that an expert of the erotic arts
has the ability to take a prospective student only so far in the actualization of erotic
knowledge. An expert in erotic matters can act as a guide but cannot supply a beginner
with knowledge in the same way, for example, an artisan can. An artisan imparts his
knowledge of a technique to his student who will, with practice, be able to replicate this.
The limits of an expert in the art of eros to adequately impart knowledge of the erotic
indicates this type of knowledge is fundamentally different from the kind of knowledge
we generally think of as “teachable.” Diotima is not teaching Socrates by way of
deductive argument or by passing down a set of techniques to him. As clearly seen in the
climax of Diotima’s speech, an expert in such matters can beckon a potential student into
an elementary understanding of the erotic arts but cannot accompany him along the road
to self-mastery.
Diotima can describe the steps of the ascent, yet the knowledge gained at “the
end of the things of love”54 can only be partially communicated through words and
images. The images Diotima provides when trying to explain the ascent to the form of
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Beauty are only images of what one would value, appreciate and seek if one sought
mastery of eros. These images serve only as general guidelines to help someone
recognize each stage on the way to mastery. The limits of the transference of erotic
knowledge from one person to another are a consequence of the inability of our words to
capture fully and adequately the scope of our erotic life. This limitation of words in
human experience brings to light an observation by Anne Carson. In her book, Eros: The
Bittersweet: An Essay, Carson provides a series of meditations of the nature of Greek
eros. She suggests that we become aware that “words have edges” when we are in love.55
Her use of the term “edges” in this context refers to our realization of the instances in
which words fall short of either helping achieve a sense of complete connection with
another or capturing fully the depth of our erotic experiences. In this case, the limitations
of Diotima’s description of the stages of the ascent mirrors the limitations of our erotic
knowledge. In part, the usefulness of our erotic experiences lies in our ability to be
mindful of how these experiences serve to further the development of our journey up the
ladder of love. The scope within which Socrates can securely assert his knowledge is
restricted by the fact that personal experience cannot be imparted to others—at least not
while retaining the clarity and power that urge us upward.
Edges or limitations are most vivid in our consciousness when we are in the midst
of erotic experience. We are frustratingly reminded of the place we end and our beloved
begins, and in our enchantment with the other we strive to confront and overcome these
limitations. We strive to become one with the other. This sentiment is present in
Aristophanes’ speech in praise of eros: “Each of us then is but the token of a human
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being, sliced like a flatfish, two from one; each then ever seeks his matching token.”56
Diotima’s account of eros and its culmination in the form of Beauty indicates the areas
where the limits of our rational abilities become apparent and a different type of
knowledge—erotic knowledge—takes over and signals the beginning of a solo journey.
This journey, which we only begin to learn about through a description of the ascent of
up the ladder of love, shares a similar nature with eros. First let us examine the nature of
Eros, the divinity.
Diotima recounts a myth of the conception of Eros, by Poros and Penia, which
explains in greater detail the nature of Eros. She describes Eros as neither a god nor a
human but something “in between”: a spirit or diamon. We learn that Eros is the child of
Penia, the goddess of Want, who personifies human erotic experience, and Poros, the god
of Resourcefulness, that essential tool on which human beings rely to overcome and
satiate want. This union of Resourcefulness and Want results in the creation of a son with
the following characteristics:
In the first place he is always poor, and he is far
from being delicate and beautiful (as ordinary people think
he is); instead, he is tough and shriveled and shoeless and
homeless, always lying on the dirt without a bed, sleeping
at people’s doorsteps and in roadsides under the sky, having
his mother’s nature, always living in Need. But on his
Father’s side he is a schemer after the beautiful and good; he
is brave and impetuous, and intense, an awesome hunter,
always weaving snares, resourceful in his pursuit of
intelligence, a lover of wisdom through all his life,
a genius with enchantments, potions and clever pleadings.
He is by nature neither immortal nor mortal. But
now he springs to life when he gets his way; now he diesall in the very same day. Because he is his father’s son,
however, he keeps coming back to life, but then anything
he finds his way to always slips away, and for this reason
Love (Eros) is never completely without resources, nor is
56
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he ever rich.57
Being neither fully divine nor fully human, Eros makes the best of his heritage. His “inbetweeness” firmly plants one foot in Hyland’s concept of finitude and the other in his
concept of transcendence. Split between the two, Eros must try to find a way to
synthesize both identities. The description of Eros as “tough,” “shriveled,” “shoeless”
and “homeless” identifies not only his most human inclinations, but a particularly
impoverished aspect of his human dimension. His roughness and hardness symbolize the
pain so often present in the human experience of erotic love. Yet because he is also his
father’s child, he always manages to find his way. He is able to harness his constant
longing for “good and beautiful things”58 and is being driven by his desire for
understanding. Eros, as characterized by Diotima, is not the same glorious god that the
others at Agathon’s party praise. Not so grounded in the realm of the gods that his
success is assured, yet not so steeped in finitude that he surpasses poverty into destitution,
Eros, always in-between, finds a way.
Eros shares similarities with the philosophical life and conjures up a mirror
image of Socrates. Socrates, like Eros, lives in the space between this world and another.
He is never fully able to achieve what he desires and is always in search of wisdom
despite his limitations. Diotima’s account of Eros’ creation myth renders Socrates an
icon of finite transcendence. Socrates tells us in the Apology that he spends his days
seeking wisdom yet he is never able to become fully wise. His ceaseless quest leads him
to conclude that the oracle at Delphi proclaims there to be no wiser man than he because
he knows what he does not know. Even with the knowledge that his quest to obtain truth
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and wisdom would never be fulfilled, he patiently continues his journey in search of
knowledge.
The description of Eros from Diotima illuminates both his human and his otherworldly tendencies and maks it easier to understand Love’s role in the ascent to the
ultimate goal of erotic experience: the revelation of the form of Beauty. According to
Diotima, there is a proper order to loving, which if followed correctly will culminate in a
brief glimpse of Beauty—that form in which all other beautiful things participate.
Diotima’s describes moving through stages of loving: from the love of a particular person
or idea, to a more universal love for all members of a group, on to love of country,
institutions and ideas, and finally to the all-encompassing form of Beauty.
This is what it is to go aright, or led by another, into the
mystery of Love: one goes always upwards for the sake
of this Beauty, starting out from beautiful things and
using them like rising stars: from one body to two
and from two to all beautiful bodies, then from beautiful
bodies to beautiful customs, and from customs to learning
beautiful things, and from these lessons he arrives at
these lessons, which is learning of this very Beauty, so
that in the end he comes to know just what it is to be beautiful.59
Socrates is intent on gazing the form of Beauty, and his commitment to this goal explains
his correcting the other speakers’ conceptions of eros. They are hung up on the
particularity of love (loving a person, a country, an idea),60 which is indicative of a
conception of eros that is mysterious, haphazard and impermanent. Something even
greater than our most intense experience of earthly love must lie at the end of our limited,
imperfect experiences. Without a higher purpose to the ecstasy, pain and drama of our
human experiences, we are bound to become disappointed by love because we expect too
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much from something that can only offer a limited vantage point of the true form of
Beauty. Socrates’ explains that the greater purpose of our erotic experiences is to inch us
closer to an experience of the perfect form of Beauty. This evolution towards Beauty
requires attention not to what Socrates has to teach us about love but to how our own
personal experiences further our intellectual and erotic development.
Socrates understands that the erotic life is not about passivity or aggressiveness
but possibility. Because Socrates was corrected by Diotima in his youth he knows that a
real understanding of the nature of love lies in being a lover, not in being loved.61 Taking
the role of lover is a selfish pursuit, for the end goal of loving an individual person or
idea is to be able to place the experience of that person or idea in the appropriate context
of the ladder of love. Each level of the ascent requires mastery over a different aspect of
one’s erotic experience. Advancement at any level requires that one does not become so
taken with beauty in its earthly form that one becomes trapped into believing that
imperfect instances of beauty are the final goal of one’s search. Socrates recognizes
Alcibiades’ physical beauty, but he also sees within him a deep desire, coupled with an
even deeper reluctance to become the best man he can be.62 Alcibiades is clearly split
between his life in politics—his “desire to please the crowd”—and the suggestions
Socrates makes to him about how to live a better life.63 Socrates does not give in to
Alcibiades’ sexual advances because he understands that doing so would negate any
serious possibility of the youth becoming the best possible man. By engaging in the kind
of relationship Alcibiades wanted, the young man would have no impetus to look beyond
the relationship to develop any greater wisdom and character on his own. Alcibiades
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would view an exclusive erotic relationship with Socrates as a medal signifying
Alcibiades intellectual and erotic proficiency, impeding any further development and
work on the young man’s part. What more is there to learn when you have already
secured the affections and commitment of a great philosopher like Socrates? Their
relationship would cease to have the mutual element Socrates clearly thought crucial for
both of them to benefit. One can imagine that Alcibiades felt just such a relationship
would serve a very powerful statement to the world about his own capabilities and
wisdom. Without the maturity to understand the currency of wisdom—what it is really
worth and how one should rightly acquire and apply it—Socrates could not offer
Alcibiades the appropriate context to grow into his erotic knowledge in the way Socrates
felt was beneficial to either. Instead, Socrates rejects Alcibiades’ advances and points
towards another possibility. “In the future,” Socrates says, “let’s consider things together.
We’ll always do what seems the best to the two of us.”64
In this snapshot of a deeply personal exchange, a parallel arises to Socrates’
speech about eros at Agathon’s party: he reframes the terms of his encounter with
Alcibiades in the same way that he reframes everyone’s understanding of eros. Both
instances end with an alternate way of looking at the practical application of something
that was really only a concept before. Instead of ending his relationships with Alcibiades
because, like the young Socrates we see with Diotima, Alcibiades cannot grasp the
purpose of love. Socrates firmly rejects the young man’s idea about the limitations of the
situation and suggests another kind of relationship. He offers a relationship that will
loosen the young man’s grasp on the physical, freeing up the possibility of Alcibiades
realizing finite transcendence. But Socrates does so gently, offering Alcibiades not just
64
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what he really needs, but what he can actually handle. His offer to Alcibiades is simple:
exposure to someone who will remind Alcibiades that he can be more than a man who
gives himself over to a “desire to please the crowd”65 even if, in the end, Alcibiades
chooses not to do so.
The details mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, such as Socrates’ unusual
interest in his physical appearance and the way we see him during Diotima and
Alcibiades’ speech, exemplify the ways in which Socrates is grounded in finitude. He is
depicted in this dialogue with his humanity exposed, not as a intellectual demi-god. The
reader gets the sense that he knows his own finitude; he knows that physical beauty pales
in comparison to true Beauty, and yet he tries to make himself attractive when going to
Agathon’s party. This effort is a nod in the direction of earthly interests, but it does not
take away from his possession of the truth, a truth that he believes lies just beyond our
grasp. Socrates, unlike Alcibiades, is able to live in the world without being taken over
by it.
Nehamas astutely points out that the dialogues rarely show an instance of
Socrates’ interlocutors being improved by him. In fact, many of his conversation partners
remain unmoved by him. Examples of this are: Protagoras, Gorgias, Polus, Callicles,
Hippias, Euthydemus, Dionysiodorus, Euthyphro, Ion and Meno to name a few.66 In the
end, we know both from the historical testimony of the life of Alcibiades, and his own
confession in the Symposium67 that no matter how convincing Socrates was, he was not
able to change this enamored follower’s life. Socrates does not claim to be a teacher—
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and rightfully so, given the understanding we come to in the Symposium of the kind of
knowledge he claims to posses: erotic knowledge. Socrates shares Diotima’s speech with
those present at the Symposium not to teach them about the nature and purpose of love
but to offer them the same opportunity afforded to him by Diotima: a chance to
reconceptualize a universal experience that each thought he knew well. In offering this
alternate perspective of the most common of all human experiences, the erotic, Socrates
gives those around him, as well as the reader, a chance to reconceptualize themselves.
Conclusion
I’d like to tell the truth my way.68
It is challenging, perhaps even impossible, to state definitively what makes
Socrates so uncomfortably different from us. There are places in the dialogues to which
one can point that evince his strangeness, such as those provided here from the
Symposium. However, these passages do not amount to an explanation of the source of
our discomfort. There is a vagueness that surrounds Socrates, and this vagueness is best
understood by working to resolve the problem of irony and finitude. Maybe there is an
underlying reason for our being both “awestruck and queasy” when we encounter
Socrates; these feelings may signal to us that we have still more philosophical exploration
to do, that we must push deeper into the character of this unusual figure. On the other
hand, this unease may provide cause for our avoiding the work it takes to apply
philosophy to all aspects of our life. It’s simply not easy being philosophical.
Having Socrates claim to be an expert in the erotic—the ultimate expression of
our finitude—is a philosophical leap for Plato. The assertion that Socrates is a paragon of
68
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a good life takes into account a rarely explored aspect of what it means to lead a
philosophical life. Socrates is a prime example of a “good life” not only because he
displays his ethical and intellectual knowledge but also because he acknowledges that he
possesses a firm grasp on a less noted aspect of a philosophical life—erotic knowledge.
Plato lived in a time and place where human sexuality was conceived in very different
terms than it is today and fulfilled entirely different social and cultural role. It is nice to
think that we are more advanced intellectually than the ancients, but the Symposium
offers an excellent opportunity to show that this simply is not the case. Socrates
recognizes the importance and power of uniting erotic experience with our intellectual
ability. Yet Socrates’ speech in theApology shows us that, by the end of his life, he did
not feel that he had become wise. As revealed in the Symposium, what he had obtained
was an understanding of the value of his erotic life and a better awareness of his own
finite self-knowledge.
To say that Socrates represents the “best human life”69 oversimplifies his
strangeness and, more significantly, his uniqueness. Something can be learned from
Socrates even if he was not a teacher: that what it means to be human rests on the
precarious, messy and often strange relationship between our intellect and our erotic
existence. Socrates is seen throughout the dialogues talking and relating to those around
him, not because he views himself as a teacher but because he viewed the fundamental
task of philosophy to be concern with the full scope of human experience—not just ideas.
Socrates’ belief in the impossibility of humanity achieving total wisdom and his
unwavering vision of the form of Beauty resulted in a way of living. But not necessarily
the best way of living.
69
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Drew Hyland and Alexander Nehamas are both concerned with the lessons we can
learn by asking what Plato took to be the project of philosophy, instead of whether he
created the best example of a human life. Each highlights the importance of creativity in
Plato’s writing and is concerned with the ways in which Plato reveals his vision of the
purpose of philosophy. Similarly, they agree that Plato sought to demonstrate philosophy
as an activity involving not simply the intellect but an entire life. With this in mind, we
ask the logical question: how does one proceed with philosophy in a time when the
academic model seems fixated on discerning the truth and falsity of propositions and the
validity of arguments? Plato is focused on broadening our conception of the boundary
between philosophy and our everyday life. By integrating personal experience and
philosophical commitment into the most challenging project of all—the creative
expression of one’s life—Plato dares his reader to join in Socrates’ legacy …by
reinventing it.
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